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T

he decision from the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals on April 16, 2009, in
the case of A.V. v. iParadigns, LLC is
the latest in a string of judicial rulings about
“fair use” that employs the concept of “transformative” use to cover “functional” uses
different from the original in a manner that is
troubling both intellectually and practically.
Intellectually, these rulings stretch the natural meaning of “transformative” well beyond
the bounds of common sense — and beyond,
I contend, the meaning intended by the jurist
whose writing gave rise to the development
of this trend in copyright interpretation in the
first place. Practically, they open a Pandora’s
box out of which all sorts of legal mischief
may ensue — and may further contribute to
the public’s already severe lack of confidence
in the unpredictability of “fair use” decisions
in the courts.
In what is undoubtedly one of the most
influential articles ever published in a law
review by a sitting judge, “Toward a Fair Use
Standard” (Harvard Law Review, March 1990),
Pierre N. Leval begins by admitting that the
reversal on appeal of two of his decisions as
a district court judge (in Salinger v. Random
House, Inc. [1987] and New Era Publications Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co. [1988]) had
led him to ponder the need for “a cogent set
of governing principles” that could get judges
like him from simply deciding cases “upon ad
hoc perceptions of justice without a permanent
framework” to help guide their interpretations.
His effort to develop “a fair use standard” takes
off from his understanding
of “the objectives of copyright law” in the United
States as being basically
“utilitarian” in nature, viz.,
viewing copyright ownership not as a natural right of
the author but as “designed
rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts
for the intellectual enrichment of the public.” The
temporary monopoly that
copyright law invests in
authors is aimed at motivating them to create
new works, but if exercised in too sweeping
a fashion, that monopoly can undermine the
creativity of others that builds on the original
authors’ works, and hence “fair use” provides
a kind of safety valve preventing copyright
from becoming counterproductive in carrying
out the Constitutional mandate “to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” As
such, fair use “is a necessary part of the overall
design” of copyright law, not just a “bizarre,
occasionally tolerated departure” from it.
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In Leval’s view, the key to keeping copyright interpretation in line with the Constitutional mandate lies in placing the concept of
“transformative use” front and center. As he
defines it, “the use must be of a character that
serves the copyright objective of stimulating
productive thought and public instruction
without excessively diminishing the incentives
for creativity.” Leval gives pride of place to
this concept as he sees it embodied in the first
of the four factors set forth in Section 107’s articulation of the considerations that courts must
bear in mind when reaching a decision about
whether any particular use is fair. This factor,
“the purpose and character of the secondary
use,” he calls at one point “the soul of fair use.”
According to Leval, “one must assess each of
the issues that arise in considering a fair use
defense in the light of the governing purpose
of copyright law,” which is manifested most
straightforwardly in this idea of “transformative use.” Although no one factor alone is
determinative in a fair use analysis, that a use
is transformative in this sense creates a strong
presumption that it is fair, and the other three
factors would need to weigh heavily against
a use being fair to override this presumption.
The use’s transformative character “lies at the
heart of the fair user’s case.”
What did Leval himself mean by “transformative”? The way he lays out his argument,
in reflecting on its application to the Salinger
and New Era cases (which involved quotations from authors J.D. Salinger and L. Ron
Hubbard in biographies written about them),
and the examples he gives
of transformative uses, both
lead naturally to the conclusion that such uses must
themselves involve acts of
creation that go beyond the
original. “If…the secondary
use adds value to the original — if the quoted matter
is used as raw material,
transformed in the creation
of new information, new
aesthetics, new insights
and understandings — this
is the very type of activity that the fair use
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment
of society.” Other examples Leval gives include “criticizing the quoted work, exposing
the character of the original author, proving
a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the
original in order to defend or rebut it,” and he
also cites “parody, symbolism, and aesthetic
declarations” as involving transformative use.
All of these may be understood as “transformative” in a perfectly straightforward sense
of that word.

The ascension of transformative use to its
current prominence in fair use jurisprudence
no doubt is attributable to the huge influence
that the case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc. (1994) has had on subsequent court decisions in this arena. Probably no single case has
been cited more frequently in cases following it
where fair use is at issue. (The opinion in this
Supreme Court case was written by Justice
David Souter, soon to retire from the bench.)
This case, concerning whether 2 Live Crew’s
parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Pretty Woman” could be considered fair, turned crucially
on “whether the new work [in this instance, 2
Live Crew’s rap rendition of the song] merely
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation…, or instead adds something new, with
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message; it asks, in other words, whether and
to what extent the new work is ‘transformative’.” This quotation is immediately followed
by a reference to Leval’s article. It is one of
seven times that article is cited in the text of
the decision, and another six citations occur
in the footnotes. No other single secondary
source is cited more frequently. The impact
of Leval’s reasoning on this case is obvious
to anyone reading the decision who is familiar
with Leval’s article. The interpretation of the
parody as a justifiable “transformative” use of
the original song is the linchpin of the decision,
sufficiently powerful to overcome the facts that
the parody itself was done for “commercial”
purposes and that the work used was “expressive” in nature — factors that usually count
against a use’s being seen as fair.
In the Second Circuit, where Leval now
serves on the Court of Appeals, another case
was decided in 2006 along the same lines. Bill
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.
pitted the owner of posters of The Grateful
Dead advertising their concerts against the
publisher of a coffee-table book titled The
Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip where the
posters, in reduced size, were reproduced as
part of a cultural history of the rock group. The
very first paragraph of the four-factor analysis
cites Judge Leval’s article and quotes the
sentence from the Campbell case that appears
above. (It should be noted that Leval was not
one of the three judges hearing this appeal, so
he was not citing himself). Here, against the
plaintiff’s claim that “merely placing poster
images along a timeline is not a transformative use,” the court argued that DK’s use of
the images “as historical artifacts to document and represent the actual occurrence of
Grateful Dead concert events featured on
Illustrated Trip’s timeline” was “transformacontinued on page 67
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tively different” from the “original artistic
and promotional purpose” and did involve
creative design to produce a “collage effect”
using both images and text in such a way as to
“enrich the presentation of the cultural history
of The Grateful Dead.” Thus, be it noted, the
secondary use was itself a creative act that in
its very creativity had transformed the original
posters to use them for a different purpose, historical reconstruction rather than promotion or
artistic expression for its own sake. This case
conforms perfectly well to Leval’s line of reasoning and uses “transformative” in its natural
sense. Here, again, although DK’s book was
published for “commercial” gain, the images
reproduced the posters in their entirety (albeit
in reduced size), and the posters qualified as
“expressive” works — all three factors usually
counting against fair use — the “transformative” nature of the use trumped other valid
considerations.
The issue of transformative use has come
up in cases in circuits other than the Second,
for instance, in Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista
decided on appeal in the Third Circuit in 2003.
Video Pipeline was in the business of supplying clips from movies as trailers for home video
stores; after a license to use trailers created by
Disney had lapsed, Video Pipeline made short
clips of its own directly from the movies and
argued that these were protected as fair use,
in part because they were “transformative,”
serving “only to provide information about the
movies to Internet users or as advertisements
for the company’s retail Website clients” rather
than fulfilling the “aesthetic and entertainment
purpose” of the original movies. Besides pointing out that the clips had no purpose different
from the trailers that Buena Vista itself supplied, and that they therefore interfered with the
market for the latter, the court also noted “the
absence of creative ingenuity in the creation of
the clips” in finding no “transformative use”
involved here to weigh against the patently
“commercial” purpose of Video Pipeline’s
clips. This lack of creativity in the secondary
use aligns this case also with Judge Leval’s
reasoning about what “transformation” means
in copyright law.
Some judges out west, however, either
didn’t grasp the plain meaning of “transformative use” as Leval explicated it in his article or
else decided to be “transformative” themselves
by creating a new and quite different meaning
for the term, which is neither a logical extension of Leval’s original nor a commonsensical
interpretation of it. Enamored, as they seem
to have been, by the vast public benefit they
perceive the Internet to have brought society,
and willing to excuse just about anything that
Google does in pursuit of the overriding objective of preserving that benefit to its maximum
extent, many judges in the Ninth Circuit have
devised their own idiosyncratic interpretation
of “transformative” as meaning anything that
serves a different function from the original
copyrighted work. Crucially, the different
function need involve no creativity at all; it
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can be the result of a purely mechanical process
performed by a computer to search Websites
and index their contents. If it took some genius to create the software that performs the
function, the implementation of it nevertheless
requires no human creativity whatsoever.
Hence, thanks to the Ninth Circuit’s prostration before the gods of cyberspace, we have
the cases of Kelly v. Arriba Soft (2002) and
Perfect 10 v. Google (2007), both of which cite
Campbell frequently. The first of these cases
involved a photographer suing a company that
had used its Internet search engine to compile a
database of images in the form of “thumbnails,”
some of which came from the photographer’s
own Website. Despite the admittedly “commercial” purpose of Arriba Soft’s database,
the court ruled that the thumbnail images
did not serve the same expressive purpose as
Kelly’s original images but, instead, facilitated
access to images on the Internet. “Because
Arriba’s use is not superseding Kelly’s use
but, rather, has created a different purpose for
the images, Arriba’s use is transformative.”
And, being transformative, this use outweighs
not only the “commercial” purpose of the database but also the facts that the works copied
are “expressive” in nature and were copied in
their entirety (albeit at reduced size). The court
took pains to emphasize the public benefit of
Arriba’s activity as “enhancing information
gathering techniques on the Internet.”
The facts in Perfect 10 v. Google were
very similar, but not identical. Again, it was
a company’s search engine locating images
at Websites, storing them as thumbnails, and
indexing them for the purpose of easy access.
Perfect 10 was in the business of supplying
photographs of nude models to customers via
the Internet and, as Kelly had earlier, sued for
infringement. Unlike Kelly, however, Perfect
10 did have a market for reduced-size images
through another company that was authorized
to license their use on cell phones. (It speaks
to the lack of imagination of the Arriba judges
that they could not envision any such market
for thumbnails). One might think that this
was indeed a significant difference. The court,
however, decided that for lack of evidence that
people had downloaded the thumbnail images
from Google for use on their cell phones,
“this potential harm to Perfect 10’s market
remains hypothetical.” This is hardly in keeping with the way the fourth factor is normally
interpreted and reeks of special pleading. The
court was clearly intent on reaching the conclusion it wanted to reach, based on its view of
what benefits the public generally, and nothing
like this was going to deter it from that goal.
Such was its hubris that, not merely content
to use Kelly as precedent, the court went the
extra mile and opined that “Google’s use of
thumbnails is highly transformative” (emphasis added). How did it justify this hyperbole?
Not only does a search engine provide “social
benefit by incorporating an original work into
a new work, namely, an electronic reference
tool. Indeed, a search engine may be more
transformative than a parody because a search
engine provides an entirely new use for the
original work, while a parody typically has
the same entertainment purpose as the original

work”. What a breathtaking leap of logic! We
are well beyond any commonsensical meaning
of “transformative” here as one creator building upon the work of another creator, which is
clearly what Pierre Leval had in mind when
he tried to put this concept forward as “the soul
of fair use.” Search engines do not create in
any meaningful sense; they merely follow the
instructions programmed into them and go
about their business, in this instance of locating and indexing content on the Web. Yet the
Ninth Circuit judges have somehow gotten it
into their heads that a purely mechanical function can be “transformative.” They have been
misled by the superficial analogies promoted
by the slippery use of the term “purpose.” Had
they focused on the “creative” element that
Leval emphasized as crucial to the meaning
of “transformative,” they could never have
reached the conclusions they did.
What looked to be a disease confined to
the west coast’s Ninth Circuit has, like the
swine flu, now begun to spread geographically
eastward. The recent decision in the Fourth
Circuit, which covers states from West Virginia
to South Carolina, takes a page right out of the
Ninth Circuit’s book. Its discussion of the first
factor, which quotes Leval’s article and the
Campbell case prominently, follows the lead
of Campbell’s Leval-inspired dictum that “the
more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use,” and it hews to the Ninth Circuit’s
open-ended construal of “different purpose”
as encompassing noncreative functional difference. The defendant iParadigm owns and
operates the Turnitin Plagiarism Detection
Service used by many high schools and colleges that allows teachers to compare student
essays against a large database of stored student
papers and journal articles. Several students
had brought suit against iParadigm for its
use of papers they had written in high school.
Among other points, their lawyers argued that
iParadigm’s use of the papers could not be
transformative “because the archiving process
does not add anything to the work” (emphasis
in original). The appeals court, however,
rebutted this argument by calling it “clearly
misguided. The use of a copyrighted work need
not alter or augment the work to be transformative in nature. Rather, it can be transformative
in function or purpose without actually adding
to the original work.” The court cites Perfect
10 v. Google as its authority for this position,
quoting in particular the passage that urged the
functional use in that case to be “highly transformative.” We can see here how far the courts
have strayed from Leval’s own understanding
of what is required for a use to be transformative. The court concluded its analysis of the
first factor by saying that “iParadigm’s use
of these works was completely unrelated to
expressive content and was instead aimed at
detecting and discouraging plagiarism.” As
with the Ninth Circuit cases, the court here
went on to interpret the other factors in light
of its construal of the use as transformative.
Thus the student papers’ being “expressive”
in nature didn’t hold much weight because
continued on page 68
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“iParadigm’s use of the works…[was] unrelated to any creative component,” its being
merely a computer-facilitated comparison of
the content of submitted student essays with
the papers stored in the database. Nor did it
matter that the entirety of the student papers
were being used in this process because it was
not their “expressive” content that was being
exploited, only the “historical fact” of plagiarism that it was the aim of the process to detect.
Urging that “the transformative nature of the
use is relevant to the market effect factor,” the
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ arguments for
effect on potential markets as “theoretical and
speculative,” just as the Ninth Circuit had done
in the Perfect 10 case. Clearly, the initial determination that the use was “transformative”
colored the court’s construal of all the other
factors, diminishing if not entirely negating
their impact on the finding of fair use. And,
just as clearly, the court was set on reaching
this conclusion because of its favorable view
of the public benefits afforded by the Turnitin
system, supporting the district court’s opinion
that it “provides a substantial public benefit
through the network of educational institutions
using Turnitin.”
This line of cases transforming the common
meaning of “transformative” championed by
Judge Leval into an all-purpose reading of
“purpose” as anything that makes a functionally different use of the copyrighted work,
however uncreative that use may be, offers a
textbook example of Georgia Harper’s story
about how judges approach fair use cases, by
making up their minds first about what benefits
the public most and then reasoning backward
through the four-factor analysis to arrive at
that predetermined conclusion. (See Harper’s
“Google This!” at http://www.utsystem.edu/
ogc/intellectualproperty/googlethis.htm). That
this is indeed a fair charge to make against the
Ninth Circuit is confirmed by one of its own
members, Judge Alex Kozinski, who accused
his fellow jurists in his dissent in Perfect 10 v.
Visa International, an extension of the Perfect
10 v. Google case, of subscribing to this theory
of what public policy requires: “(1) to promote
the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive media [and] (2) to preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation.” Judge Kozinski
also reminded his colleagues that it is the role
of the legislature, not the judiciary, to decide
what U.S. public policy should be.
Contrast the Ninth Circuit’s obeisance to
functionality so long as it provides a perceived
public benefit with the reasoning of Judge Jon
Newman, Leval’s colleague on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, who wrote about
photocopying in the famous American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. (1994) case:
“We would seriously question whether the fair
use analysis that has developed with respect to
works of authorship alleged to use portions of
copyrighted material is precisely applicable to
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copies produced by mechanical means. The
traditional fair use analysis, now codified in
section 107, developed in an effort to adjust
the competing interests of the authors — the
author of the original copyrighted work and
the author of the secondary work that ‘copies’
a portion of the original work in the course of
producing what is claimed to be a new work.
Mechanical ‘copying’ of an entire document,
made readily feasible by the advent of xerography..., is obviously an activity entirely
different from creating a work of authorship.
Whatever social utility copying of this sort
achieves, it is not concerned with creative
authorship (italics added).” This reasoning
entirely comports with the argument of Judge
Leval in his 1990 article. And it runs directly
counter to the Ninth Circuit’s (and now the
Fourth Ciurcuit’s) intellectually obfuscating
attempt to insert claims of social utility into
the bowels of fair use analysis.
This is not to argue that references to the
greater public good have no place in fair use
analysis at all. Indeed, it was Leval’s explicit
aim to find a principled way of interpreting fair
use that would reflect the Constitutional objective of having copyright law serve the public
good of promoting the progress of knowledge.
But, unlike the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, the
Second has made that attempt without distorting
fundamental aspects of copyright or departing
from the ordinary use of language. Still, it
may be that Leval’s approach is itself not fully
adequate to the full range of considerations that
fair use analysis needs to take into account, and
it may have created as much harm as benefit by
suggesting that, as the “soul of fair use,” the
“transformative” nature of a secondary use can
be deployed to diminish the importance of the
other three factors. In a comment on Leval’s
article titled “Fair’s Fair” in the same issue of the
Harvard Law Review, Lloyd Weinreb cogently
argues that Leval errs in trying to force all fair
use analysis into the Procrustean bed of “the
utilitarian premises of the copyright scheme
as a whole” and suggests instead that besides
“the general purpose of copyright…, a number
of other factors also have to be taken into account, among which customary practice and the
prevailing understanding of what constitutes
fair conduct in the circumstances are the most
important.” Only with this more expansive approach to fair use, Weinreb urges, can one make
sense of the decisions in two of the leading cases
about fair use decided by the Supreme Court:
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studies, Inc. (1984) and Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (1985).
Straightforward comparison of Sony
and Harper & Row according to the
statutory factors has puzzling results.
The “purpose and character” of the use
in Sony was private; in Harper & Row,
the use was news reporting, a public purpose with unusually strong constitutional protection. The copyrighted works in
Sony included fictional works, presumably entitled to greater protection than
factual works; Harper & Row involved
an account of actual events. In Sony,
the whole work was copied; in Harper
& Row, fewer than four hundred words

from a manuscript of 200,000 words.
Although the practice of time-shifting
television programs was extremely
widespread, the Court in Sony held that
the plaintiffs had not met their burden
of proving that “some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.” In Harper
& Row, the plaintiff’s loss was $12,500
for a license to publish an excerpt from
the copyrighted work. On the surface
of things, Harper & Row looks like a
much better candidate for a finding of
fair use than Sony. Yet the results in the
two cases, decided just sixteen months
apart, are the reverse.
Needless to say, Leval’s approach does not
work well for these two cases. The time-shifting at issue in the Sony case is not “transformative” at all in Leval’s sense (though might
be seen as compatible with the Ninth Circuit’s
functional construal). By contrast, the use of
an excerpt from President Ford’s memoir in
The Nation’s article is a classic example of
“transformative” use, further blessed by having “news reporting” cited explicitly in the
preamble of Section 107 as one of the “purposes” where fair use most comes into play as a
limitation on the rights of the copyright owner.
Key to the outcomes of the two cases were the
other considerations that Weinreb alleges to
be important also: “customary practice” in
the case of Sony (because time-shifting for
private viewing in the home was a commonly
accepted practice) and “fair conduct” in the
case of Harper & Row (where The Nation
was charged with obtaining a copy of Ford’s
unpublished manuscript by theft).
Weinreb’s argument thus allows for a
broader range of factors to be taken into consideration in arriving at decisions about fair
use, and his approach suggests that they just be
straightforwardly put on the table, rather than
smuggled in through the back door of Leval’s
utilitarian principles. The error of the Ninth
and Fourth Circuits, then, may be viewed as
following Leval’s approach of stressing the
primacy of “transformative” use but having
to distort it in order to import these broader
considerations of public benefit seen by these
courts as deriving from computer technology,
which could more simply have been brought
forward as separate points to bear in mind.
How could this be done? Both Leval and
Weinreb offer suggestions for harmonizing
copyright law and the public interest. Leval’s
recommendation is to recognize the author’s
entitlement to compensation for creative effort
by awarding damages but to deny an injunction
against the use if it is indeed “transformative”
and strongly in the public interest. Weinreb
agrees that this recommendation “has merit.”
For a situation “when a practice as widespread
as taping television programs is at stake, however, resort to a compulsory license — the
consequence of withholding an injunction and
awarding damages — is more appropriately a
legislative task. Congress has provided for a
compulsory license in similar circumstances.”
Nimmer on Copyright, discussing the vexed
issue of photocopying arising from Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States (1975), offers
continued on page 69
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another suggestion for balancing the interests
of copyright owners and the public: “even in
copyright actions against nongovernmental
entities, where the remedy of permanent injunction is available, a court could withhold
injunctive relief and provide instead for the
mandatory payment of a royalty as a condition
of further photocopying,” i.e., “a judificially
created compulsory license.”
Nimmer on Copyright proposes a “functional test” as a means for deciding when
certain uses are fair: “if, regardless of medium,
the defendant’s work, although containing substantially similar material, performs a different
function than that of the plaintiff’s, the defense
of fair use may be invoked.” One example
given is where “unauthorized reproduction of
chorus lyrics of songs were held noninfringing
fair use where such reproductions appeared in
magazine articles” rather than in sheet music
competing for the same market as the original.
This “functional test” was inspired by a suggestion from Judge Richard Posner, who
urged the recognition that “copying that is
complementary to the copyrighted work…is
fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the
copyrighted work…, or for derivative works
from the copyrighted work, is not fair use”.
This approach, though it may seem superficially similar to the Ninth Circuit’s because of
the reference to functionality, is in fact quite
different. Rather than being tortured out of the
notion of “transformative” use, this “functional
test” is instead “viewed as an expansion of the
fourth fair use factor…[and] vindicates the
oft-cited assertion…that that factor emerges
as the central fair use determinant, in result
if not always in stated rationale.” Nimmer,
like Weinreb, looks at some Supreme Court
cases whose outcomes appear to be quite puzzling without being understood in terms of this
“functional test.”
Consider the four Supreme Court cases
decided under the fair use doctrine in the
decade beginning in 1984. Each of the
three initial fair use factors defies characterization that can consistently explain
the court’s ultimate conclusion in those
cases. The first factor reveals conflicting impulses, whether scrutinized as to
commercial use or to transformative use,
or according to the statutory preamble.
On the commercial scale, Nation and
Abend [Stewart v. Abend, 1990] both
disallow fair use for commercial uses,
whereas Sony allows it in a noncommercial context; but Campbell allows
fair use for commercial exploitation.
On the transformative scale, Campbell
weighs in favor of fair use for a productive use, yet Nation and Abend rule
against fair use for what is admittedly
a productive use; even more strangely,
Sony allows fair use for a nonproductive
use. In terms of the presumptively fair
activities enumerated in the preamble
to Section 107, the activity in Campbell constituted “criticism, comment,”
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and hence, inclines towards fair use,
whereas the activity in Abend met none
of the preamble specifications and was
held unfair, both as expected, yet the
activity in Sony fell into none of the preamble categories, and was nonetheless
held fair; completely confounding expectations, Nation dealt with protected
“news reporting,” but nonetheless held
against fair use.
The second factor likewise produces
disparate results. Abend unsurprisingly
disallows fair use for a highly creative
work, yet Campbell and Sony allow
the use for similarly creative works;
and Nation seems totally out of kilter,
disallowing fair use for a factual work.
The third factor is likewise mixed.
Campbell allows fair use for less than
total copying, but Nation and Abend
both disallow fair use for less than total
copying; by contrast, Sony allows fair
use for total copying!
Nimmer goes on to consider how the
“functional test” fares better as an explanation for the outcomes of these four cases and
concludes: “then the fourth factor, as expanded
by the functional test, is currently the most
reliable touchstone for performing fair use
analysis.” One wonders why the appeals
courts in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits did
not follow Nimmer’s lead, or the suggestions
of both Leval and Weinreb about injunctions
and compulsory licenses, rather than stretch the
applicability of “transformative use” beyond
its ordinary-language limits. That would have
been an intellectually more honest and satisfactory way of reaching the conclusions they
wanted to reach about the public interest and
saved them from sometimes very contorted
reasoning that betrays the special pleading in
which they were manifestly engaged.
Why should anyone care about how these
courts reached their decisions? There are, in
fact, very good reasons for university presses,
indeed all publishers, to be concerned. If the
Google Settlement comes undone, perhaps
under pressure from the Justice Department
about its anti-trust implications (which seems
more possible than ever in light of recently announced changes in that Department’s strategy
for dealing with anti-trust issues, where its
potential impact on Google was mentioned
in news stories reporting the change), the suit
against Google will presumably resume in the
Second Circuit. For publishers’ sake, we may
hope that the Second Circuit stays true to Judge
Leval’s concept of “transformative use” and
does not depart down the dangerous path that the
Ninth Circuit has taken. If it does, Google may
yet lose its battle in court over fair use. But the
risk remains that the west coast disease, having
now spread eastward to the Fourth Circuit, will
begin infecting judges in the Second Circuit as
well. (Some signs of the disease having already
begun to spread further may indeed be found
in both the Bill Graham Archives and Video
Pipeline cases, which cite Kelly approvingly).
If that happens, all bets are off.
But this is not the only suit that stands in
jeopardy from this spreading disease. The
Fifth Circuit now has under consideration the

suit brought by two university presses, joined
by a commercial academic publisher, against
Georgia State University for its alleged infringing activities in providing unauthorized
copies of publications to students through its
course-management, e-reserve, and other educational systems. But can coursepack copying
really be construed as fair? Copyright expert
Jonathan Band, in the white paper titled
“Educational Fair Use Today” (December
2007) prepared for the ARL, believes that it
can indeed be construed as fair if interpreted
under the rubric of “transformative use,” as
that was explicated especially in the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10. According to
Band, “an educational use of an entertainment
product is transformative because the work
is being repurposed….[and], when a teacher
reproduces a poem, a sound recording, or a
photograph so that his students can study the
work, his use is transformative” — as though,
magically, merely making copies available to
students somehow adds value to them because
of the new context of their use. He further
suggests that “tools like Blackboard permit
an instructor to create an online anthology for
a class, including copyrighted works, commentary, lecture notes, and student reactions” and
“this recontextualization appears to provide a
stronger fair use defense than would a libraryrun e-reserves containing just the plain text of
works.” This theory would also presumably
sanction publishing such an anthology online
through the library or an institutional repository, eliminating the need for any permissioning of the copyrighted contents. Band does
admit that “the repurposing argument provides
less protection with respect to works that target
the education market,” but he goes on to distinguish in this respect textbooks from journal
articles and academic books. Journal articles,
he asserts, have scholars as their primary audience and “because undergraduates are not the
target audience of journal articles, inclusion of
such articles in e-reserves or a course Website
might well be treated as a form of repurposing.” Academic books, he believes, fall in a
middle ground, “but even if the book is aimed
to some extent at the student market, a course
Website could recontextualize the book.” (For
my full critique of Band’s position, see my
article titled “What Is Educational Fair Use?
in Against the Grain, April 2008). If judges in
the Fifth Circuit catch the Ninth Circuit disease,
then the outcome of this suit may well not
favor publishers’ interests. On the other hand,
Nimmer’s “functional test,” emphasizing the
key role of the fourth factor, would likely result
in an outcome favorable to publishers, and
even the suggestions forwarded by Leval and
Weinreb with regard to compulsory licensing,
while not an ideal solution from a publisher’s
point of view, would respect the copyright
ownership of the authors and their publishers
by recognizing their legitimate interests in a
return on their investment.
To conclude, my modest proposal is that
judges in all of the other nine circuits outside
the Ninth and Fourth don the metaphorical equivalent of surgical masks to reduce
the risk of their exposure to the west coast
disease.

<http://www.against-the-grain.com>
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